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Legal recognition of advance refusal needed
The Hong Kong Law Reform Commission issued its
Consultation Paper (LRCCP) on ‘Substitute Decision-
Making and Advance Directives in relation to Medical
Treatment’ (www.info.gov.hk/hkreform) in July 2004.
It rejected giving legal status to advance directives.
An advance directive is a form of ‘living will’,
which outlines the treatment desired when an indi-
vidual lacks the capacity to make a decision of his
own. This is called a living will because it is meant
to operate whilst the maker is alive, albeit incapacitated.
In view of the increasing treatment interventions
now available, there is growing recognition that an
individual has the right to refuse what may be con-
sidered an unnecessary prolongation of the dying
process. Because a living will usually involves the
refusal of life-sustaining treatment under certain de-
fined circumstances, it is also called an advance refusal.
The author argues that legal recognition of advance
refusal is required to protect both doctors, and patients
and their family.
It is of interest to note that the LRCCP also
suggests that an advance directive can demand all
possible available treatment. This is in reality not a
real issue because a patient has no right in law to
demand medically futile treatment. This legal position
has been affirmed in a number of English cases, and
is now reiterated in the Hong Kong Hospital Author-
ity Guidelines on Life-sustaining Treatment in the
Terminally Ill (The HA Guidelines 2002).
Current legal status of an advance refusal
In Hong Kong, no case law exits regarding the valid-
ity of an advance refusal. The validity of an advance
refusal in common law is discussed, however, in an
English case of re T: adult refusal of medical treatment.
In that case, Lord Donaldson sets out four criteria for
an advance refusal to be both valid and binding:
(1) The patient has the necessary mental capacity;
(2) The patient contemplates the actual situation
which later arises;
(3) The patient appreciates the consequences of
refusing treatment; and
(4) The patient is not unduly influenced by another
person.
One difficulty with the common law is that it does
not stipulate any formal requirements for an advance
refusal. Thus, an oral directive may be both valid and
binding. Similarly, a written advance refusal, although
not signed, dated, or witnessed, may also be both
valid and binding. This may lead to uncertainty and
give rise to disputes between a doctor and a patient’s
relatives over the patient’s prior instructions.
Another difficulty with an advance refusal in
common law concerns the scope of a directive. A
doctor who is required to judge the applicability of
an advance refusal in a life-and-death situation is
likely to be concerned that legal liability may follow
from wrongfully continuing to provide, or withdraw-
ing life-sustaining treatment. For instance, in the case
of Malette v Shulman (1990, Ontario Court of Appeal)
a Jehovah’s Witness woman carried a card stating:
no blood transfusion in any circumstances. The doctor
judged that it was inapplicable in a life-threatening
condition after an accident. He proceeded with blood
transfusion. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that
the refusal was categorical even in a life-threatening
condition. Consequently, the doctor was held liable.
In light of these difficulties, the law needs to
provide clearer guidance to doctors on the validity of
an advance refusal, and thus relieve doctors from any
doubt concerning legal liability.
LRCCP recommendations
The LRCCP notes three advantages of legal recogni-
tion of advance refusal. These include:
(1) format and manner of execution to be prescribed
by law;
(2) certainty for the individual and the doctor, thus
reducing the likelihood of disputes; and
(3) enhancing patients’ autonomy.
The LRCCP also admits that having surveyed
the law in some of the major common law jurisdic-
tions, almost all have provided statutory recognition
to advance refusal. It is therefore surprising that the
LRCCP rejects legal recognition. Instead, it recom-
mends continuing reliance on the common law as well
as promoting the use of a non-statutory model form
for advance refusal by the government.
Danger on using a non-statutory model form
The author believes that the use of a non-statutory
134      Hong Kong Med J Vol 11 No 2 April 2005
model form is insufficient for tackling the current
problems. To make things worse, the use of the non-
statutory model form may create two misconceptions,
either of which may compound the difficulties doc-
tors currently face. First, if the government promotes
the use of the non-statutory model form, it may be
thought to be the only option for making a valid
advance refusal, when in fact, other possibilities
also exist for making a valid advance refusal under
the common law. Second, the non-statutory model
form may convey the impression that the scope of
an advance refusal is restricted to the withholding or
withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment in cases
of terminal illness, whereas in fact the common law
does not contain this restriction, as may be seen in
the case of Malette v Shulman above.
More importantly, if we assume that the use of
advance refusal can be promoted successfully—
whether by virtue of the non-statutory model form
or not—then doctors must know to what extent they
are obliged to honour an advance refusal, including
situations in which the family objects. This, however,
is not addressed by the LRCCP.
Legal obligations created by an advance
refusal
Where a patient makes a valid advance refusal, it is
legally binding and a doctor must comply. There are
various approaches that can be taken to clarify a
doctor’s obligations under the law. For instance, the
Singapore Advance Medical Directive Act 1996
provides that a doctor is duty bound to act in accord-
ance with an advance refusal. It further provides that
a doctor shall not be subject to civil or criminal liabil-
ity or to discipline for professional misconduct for
a decision made by him/her in good faith and without
negligence. Finally, where a doctor has a conscien-
tious objection to carrying out an advance refusal,
he is duty bound to take all reasonable steps for
the care of the patient to be transferred to another
doctor who does not so object.
Status of family objection
Another crucial issue overlooked by the LRCCP is that
by failing to accord legal status to an advance refusal,
an individual’s right to self-determination is pitched
against the weight of the family’s views, with doctors
potentially in the middle of any dispute arising.
In Hong Kong, the family plays an important role
in decision-making in the case of an incompetent
adult. However, the HA Guidelines 2002 states that
when a patient has lost the capacity to decide, a valid
advance directive refusing life-sustaining treatment
should be respected. In light of the HA Guidelines
2002, it is vital that the law affirms the same approach,
eliminating any possible ambiguities.
Conclusion
The law currently does not specifically cater for
advance refusal. Law reform is therefore appropriate
first to allow for this possibility, and second, to clarify
the obligations of doctors. Legislation needs to include
additional provisions, for example, to protect doctors
from liability when they act in good faith. It also
needs to make clear that advance refusal does not
allow for the refusal of basic care (or nursing care)
or palliative care.
(This paper was presented at the 11th Scientific
Meeting of the Pacific Rim College of Psychiatrists,
Hong Kong, 28-31 October 2004.)
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